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Abstract 
Using a sample of 42,376 board directors and 10,508 security analysts we construct a social 
network, mapping the connections between analysts and directors, between directors, and 
between analysts. We use social capital theory and techniques developed in social network 
analysis to measure the analyst’s level of connectedness and investigate whether these 
connections provide any information advantage to the analyst. We find that better-connected 
(better-networked) analysts make more accurate, timely, and bold forecasts. Moreover, analysts 
with better network positions are less likely to lose their job, suggesting that these analysts are 
more valuable to their brokerage houses. We do not find evidence that analyst innate forecasting 
ability predicts an analyst’s future network position. In contrast, past forecast optimism has a 
positive association with building a better network of connections.  
 
Security analysts are among the most important information intermediaries in capital markets. 
They produce reports that contain earnings forecasts, investment recommendations and target 
prices, through which they reveal important information to other market participants. Because of 
their significance for the efficient functioning of markets, prior studies have identified various 
factors that explain differences in analyst performance and affect their implicit or explicit 
incentives. 
In this paper we investigate the importance of an analyst’s network position on forecast 
accuracy, timeliness and boldness. Although it has been advocated that economic agents may 
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gain information advantages through their network connections and their network position 
(Coleman 1988; Burt 1992; Cohen, Frazinni and Malloy 2009) it is not clear that such 
advantages would exist among security analysts. First, regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in the US 
prohibits selective disclosure of information from companies. Therefore, information from board 
members to analysts should flow only through public announcements and conference calls that 
are open to the public. Second, information flows from one analyst to another competing analyst 
only if complementarities exist in the information structure (Stein 2008). Whether such 
complementarities, which allow information exchange through networks, exist is an empirical 
question. Third, studies have shown that analysts covering more firms and/or more industries 
have worse performance (Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys and Neale 1999). This result is counter 
intuitive from a network perspective, because if connections do provide information advantages 
to the analysts then analysts who cover relatively more firms over more industries are more 
likely also to be better-connected. 
The network we construct comprises 42,376 board directors from 4,444 firms and 10,508 
analysts from 612 brokerage houses. Using social capital theory and techniques developed in 
social network analysis we measure different qualities of the analyst’s network position and use 
these measures to proxy for the likelihood that the analysts will be able to obtain private 
information from her network connections. This proxy assumes that analyst’s connections 
determine inter alia, the likelihood of them receiving private information. For example, an 
analyst position within the network (e.g. the type of connections she has) will determine the 
quality, amount and timeliness of the information she receives. The proxy does not rely on the 
presumption that an executive or non-executive director will provide an analyst with insider 
information via an explicit one-on-one conversation. The proxy merely captures the increased 
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likelihood that an analyst with a relatively better network position will have more opportunities 
to be privy to more and better quality information. For example, the closer an analyst is to others 
in the network (e.g. the more direct connections they have relative to indirect ones) will 
determine how early she will receive information and the quality of such information. Similarly, 
following Stein’s (2008) argument these different connections may also provide the analyst with 
better opportunities to receive complementary information. For example, take the following 
scenario: a well connected analyst attends a press release; due to her better network position she 
is likely to be privy, at some point in time, to the separate complementary conversations taking 
place in the room. Whereas, a less well connected analyst is less likely to be privy to the same 
level of chatter/gossip and thus new information. Social capital theory would suggest that 
individuals who hold a ‘brokerage position’ within a network (i.e. connects disparate 
unconnected groups of individuals in network) will receive different information sets, which 
enable them to create information arbitrage. We validate this proxy by investigating the 
association between an analyst’s network position and the likelihood of them attending and 
participating in a conference call. We find that the better an analyst’s network position the more 
likely they are to participate in and to ask more questions in a conference call. This suggests that 
our proxy does capture the analyst’s relative information inflow opportunities.  
We find that the closer an analyst is to others in the network (e.g. the centrality of the analyst) 
and the quality of their brokerage position (e.g. the betweenness of an analyst) is positively 
related to forecast accuracy. Moreover, when the analyst is not a member of a very tight knit 
(highly clustered, cliquey) network they have better forecast accuracy. All these relations are 
economically meaningful. An analyst with an excellent brokerage position and therefore in the 
90th percentile of betweenness has 4.65 percent lower forecast error compared to an analyst at the 
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10th percentile. For example, Meredith Whitney, one of the most influential banking analysts in 
Wall Street after predicting the collapse of the banking sector due to subprime losses, scores at 
the 90th percentile of betweenness.  
Moreover, we find that these network measures have a significant association with the forecast 
horizon of the first forecast each analyst makes for a company each year. Therefore, suggesting 
that better-networked analysts are also leaders in terms of forecast timeliness. An analyst at the 
90th percentile of betweenness makes her first forecast on average four days earlier than an 
analyst at the 10th percentile. In addition, these analysts make bolder forecasts. The absolute 
difference between their revised forecast and the consensus forecast just prior to the revision is 
greater for analysts with higher closeness or betweenness. These results hold after we control for 
other known determinants of forecast accuracy, timeliness and boldness. 
Since an analyst’s position in the network can explain variation in analyst performance, we 
also investigate whether it has implications for an analyst’s career outcome. Specifically, we test 
whether better-networked analysts face a lower probability of losing their job. We find that 
analysts in the bottom ten percent of betweenness have 7.73 percentage points higher probability 
of turnover relative to analysts in the top ten percent. This result holds after controlling for 
experience, brokerage house, number of firms and industries covered by an analyst, relative 
accuracy and relative optimism effects. 
Finally, we provide evidence on determinants of networks. We use as a proxy for innate ability 
to forecast earnings, excluding any network effects, the forecast accuracy at the first year of an 
analyst’s career. We find that this measure has no relation to future network position. Therefore, 
the results that link analyst performance and network position are unlikely to suffer from an 
omitted variable bias because of unobserved heterogeneity in analyst ability. We also construct a 
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more comprehensive model that explains most of the variation in how well networked is an 
analyst. We find that past accuracy earlier or later in an analyst’s career has no influence on 
networks. In contrast, past optimism later in an analyst’s career is positively associated with 
building a good network position in the future. Contemporaneous size of brokerage house, 
number of industries and firms covered by an analyst and experience are all associated with 
better network position. In addition, past size of brokerage house, number of industries and 
number of firms covered by an analyst are also incrementally associated with better network 
position. 
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on social network effects in economics (Hong, 
Kubik and Stein 2005; Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu 2007; Cohen, Frazinni and Malloy 2008; 
Cohen, Frazinni and Malloy 2009; Stein 2008). Security analysts influence stock prices and are 
therefore important economic agents in the price discovery process (Gleason and Lee 2003; 
Kelly and Ljungqvist 2007). As a result, understanding factors that affect their performance and 
implicit incentives is important. This paper also contributes to the debate surrounding the 
differential performance of individual analysts (Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys and Neale 1999; 
Malloy 2005) by showing that an analyst’s social network position is an additional dimension 
that affects their performance. Moreover, the results on past optimism and network position 
suggest an agency component to the relation between firms and analysts since analysts can 
strategically exhibit optimism later in their career to improve their connections with firms and 
ultimately their network position. 
This study also has implications for regulations such as Fair Disclosure that was passed in 
October 23, 2000. This regulation aims to eliminate selective disclosure and therefore any 
sources of information advantage such as the one this study uncovers. Since all our data is post-
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regulation we infer that social network effects are too strong for any regulation to eliminate fully. 
This is consistent with Mayew (2008) who also documents that the information playing field is 
not leveled after Regulation FD by providing evidence that management discriminates among 
analysts during conference calls. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we review the related literature and form the 
hypotheses of this study. Section II describes the data. Section III constructs the necessary 
measures and presents the research design. Section IV shows the results on the association 
between forecast characteristics and an analyst’s position in the network and Section V shows 
the results on the relation between analyst turnover and network measures. We present the results 
on the determinants of network measures in section VI and we conclude in Section VII. 
 
I. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
A large literature examines whether analysts exhibit differential forecasting ability (Clement 
1999; Jacob, Lys and Neale 1999; Bolliger 2004; Malloy 2005; Bradshaw and Brown 2008). 
These papers document that forecast horizon and the inverse of brokerage house size are 
positively associated with forecast error. Portfolio complexity, defined as number of companies 
and industries followed by the analyst, is positively related to forecast error in the US (Clement 
1999; Jacob, Lys and Neale 1999) but not in Europe (Bolliger 2004). The effect of firm-specific 
or general experience is rather more hotly debated with little emerging consensus (Jacob, Lys 
and Neale 1999; Clement, Koonce and Lopez 2007). 
These previous studies however have paid less attention to the role of social networks in capital 
markets and in particular analyst performance. Cohen, Frazinni and Malloy (2009) document that 
analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link with a 
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board member from the company. Similarly, Cohen, Frazinni and Malloy (2008) show that 
mutual fund managers gain information advantage through their educational ties with board 
members. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) explore the word-of-mouth effect between mutual fund 
managers by showing that trades of mutual funds, which are located in the same city, are 
correlated. Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) apply social network analysis to derive 
measures of centrality, as in this study, and find that better-networked venture capitalists have 
better performance. 
There are several advantages to focusing on security analysts in testing whether social network 
position delivers an information advantage. The availability of analyst data provides us with the 
opportunity to construct a large network where each actor can be connected to a large number of 
people. Therefore, we are able to include almost the universe of sell side analysts in the US to 
construct a relatively comprehensive network. Also, since analysts’ performance depends 
crucially on gaining an information advantage, this industry is an ideal testing ground to 
determine whether social networks facilitate information flow. 
In contrast to prior studies and similar to Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007), we do not 
consider a particular characteristic, such as education or geographical proximity, through which 
social interactions might take place but rather we construct a network to extract measures of 
social capital. Prior research documents that agents at the core of the social network have more 
valuable information (Freeman 1977). More importantly, being an information broker or 
spanning structural holes is an even better indicator of social capital than just network centrality 
(Cook and Emerson 1978; Burt 1992). People who act as information brokers in the network 
connect other people or groups of people indirectly through them and therefore if they were 
absent such an indirect link would not exist. These actors have access to a wider diversity of 
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information, early access to that information and control over information diffusion (Burt 1982, 
1992; Schumpeter 1934; Merton 1949; Granovetter 1973; March 1991). These three advantages 
together give an opportunity for information arbitrage (Burt 2005). Other studies have found a 
link between social capital and performance in other settings. For example, Mizruchi and Stearns 
(2001) show that loan officers in a large commercial bank with more social capital are more 
probable to close a successful deal. Apart from examining forecast accuracy and timeliness, we 
consider forecast boldness since Clement and Tse (2003) find that bold forecasts are more 
accurate than herding and incorporate analysts’ private information more completely. Therefore, 
our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: An analyst with higher social capital will make more accurate, timely and bold 
forecasts. 
Past research has also examined analysts’ career outcomes (Michail, Walther and Willis 1999; 
Hong, Salomon and Kubik 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003). In general, these studies find that 
forecast accuracy and optimism are associated with promotion or a decrease in the probability of 
job loss. If analysts can gain an information advantage because of their position in the network 
then we expect that this leads to favorable career outcomes since analysts can use their network 
as a bargaining tool against their employers. Bolliger (2004) argues that brokerage houses 
consider the network an analyst has built during her tenure in hiring decisions. There is also 
evidence in other settings that information brokerage is rewarded. Podolny and Barron (1997) 
show that senior managers in an electronics firm with more social capital are more likely to get 
promoted early. Gabbay and Zuckerman (1998) find that expectations of promotion are higher 
for research and development scientists with higher social capital. Horton, Millo and Serafeim 
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(2009) show that in a broad cross-section of UK firms more central directors earn higher 
compensation. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: An analyst with higher social capital is less likely to face unfavorable career 
outcomes. 
 
II. Data 
A. Network Sample 
We use two data sets to construct our network of analysts and directors. The data for 
directorships is obtained from The Corporate Library. This database provides data covering 
2001-2007 for 136,615 directorships, 42,376 unique directors and 4,444 unique US firms (Table 
I). The analyst data is obtained from I/B/E/S. There are 10,508 unique analysts in the database 
working for 612 unique brokers. These analysts cover 10,231 unique companies. More data is 
available for the later years than for the earlier. For example, the network has 15,434 individuals 
in 2001 whereas there are 37,098 individuals in 2007. 
For each year we construct the network by connecting analyst to analyst, analyst to director 
and director to director. A director is directly linked to another director if they sit on the same 
board and is directly linked to an analyst if the analyst covers their company. An analyst is linked 
to another analyst if they work for the same brokerage house or if they analyze the same firm 
(see Appendix). We assume that it is more probable that analysts and directors interact with each 
other under these conditions.1 For example, analyst A is more likely to talk to analyst B if they 
participate in the same conference call compared to analyst C that neither works at the same 
                                                          
1
 Conversations with sell side analysts confirm that this is a reasonable assumption. Analysts are more likely to 
interact socially and professionally with directors that sit on the boards of firms they cover and analysts that either 
work on the same brokerage house or cover the same firms. The main reasons behind this phenomenon are common 
interests and physical presence in the same places during investment days or other professional and social events.  
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brokerage house nor covers any stocks in analyst A’s portfolio. Similarly, if analyst A covers 
company E then she is more likely to talk to director D who sits on the board of company E than 
to director F who sits on the board of company G, which analyst A does not cover. 
 
B. Analysis Sample 
To test the hypotheses we obtain analysts’ 1-year forecasts from I/B/E/S. However the data 
coverage of I/B/E/S does not provide a perfect match to the Corporate Library sample and 
therefore we were only able to obtain data for a sub-sample of our network sample. 2 On average 
this provides us with approximately 80% of the companies and 70% of the individual analysts in 
the network matching with I/B/E/S. The subsample does however provide us with a broad cross-
section of the largest US firms.  
We exclude all firms that are covered by fewer than three analysts in a year since we perform 
within firm-year analysis and all analysts that are teams or that have a code which appears 
unrealistically often in the database. For example, we exclude codes that cover more than one 
hundred firms in a year or codes that are associated with more than three brokerage houses in a 
year. Moreover, we exclude codes that make fewer than three forecasts during 2001-2007. We 
consider those codes more likely to be data errors than representing persons, or junior analysts 
with very limited experience who exit the profession quickly. This sample selection yields 3,502 
unique companies and 7,736 unique analysts (Table I). The sample includes 160,460 unique 
analyst-firm-year forecasts.  
 
                                                          
2
 Extending the analysis to all companies with data available in IBES does not change the results of this study. The 
increase in the sample for years 2001-2005 is moderate and for years 2006 and 2007 is very small. This happens 
because the companies that Corporate Library does not have board membership data for are smaller and therefore it 
is more probable that they are going to be followed by fewer than three analysts from our sample. 
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III. Measurement of Variables and Research Design 
A. Social Network Measures 
Closeness centrality is calculated as the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e. the shortest 
path) between an individual (node v), in our case an analyst, and all other individuals (nodes) 
reachable from it (see Appendix A). The higher this measure is, the more central the analyst is 
within the network. This centrality provides the analyst with the opportunity to have a relatively 
better access to the information in the whole network i.e. information has to travel through less 
mediators to reach a person with high closeness centrality compared to an individual with low 
closeness centrality (Stephenson and Zelen 1989). The measure is normalized and ranges from 
zero to one. 
Betweenness centrality is the ratio between paths connecting two actors that pass through a 
particular actor and between all other paths that connect the two persons. Again, the measure is 
normalized and ranges from zero to one. Betweenness indicates how much information flows 
'through' an analyst and, consequently, the degree to which that analyst can serve as a broker 
between pairs of other actors. Therefore, analysts with high betweeness have the opportunity to 
control the information flow within the network. 
K-core is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where each analyst has at least k 
immediate neighbors (Seidman 1983). The higher the k of an actor, the better connected her 
neighbors are and, consequently, the less brokerage opportunities she will have, her information 
will be relatively less scarce and her actions will be more constrained (Moody and White 2003). 
We divide this measure by the analyst’s degree3 and therefore this measure also ranges from zero 
to one. The closer the measure is to one, the less relative advantage the analyst’s information is 
likely to have. 
                                                          
3
 Degree is the count of the number of ties to other actors in the network. 
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To give a better feel of these measures Table II presents correlations between social network 
characteristics, analyst experience, size of the brokerage house and number of firms and 
industries covered by each analyst. Below the diagonal we present correlations for the raw 
variables and above the diagonal correlations for the variables after adjusting for firm-year 
effects. Ex ante we expect betweenness and closeness to have a positive association with all the 
variables. Whereas in contrast, the K-core should have a negative association. For example, the 
more experienced the analyst is to the more able they are to build a better network position over 
time. Also, by simply covering more firms and more industries provides relatively more 
opportunities for the analyst to control information flow in the network. In addition working for a 
larger brokerage house also increases the centrality of an analyst in the network. 
Table II confirms the above predictions. Our discussion focuses only on the correlations 
between the variables after adjusting for firm-year effects, given the correlations for the raw 
variables are similar. We find the association between closeness and betweenness is positive 
association as expected (0.57). K-core has a strong negative association with betweenness (-0.35) 
and a weak negative relation with closeness (-0.05). More experienced analysts who work in 
larger brokerage houses and cover more firms and more industries appear to have a higher social 
capital. Although the brokerage house size is a more significant determinant of an analyst’s 
closeness compared to other variables. In contrast, the number of firms and industries covered is 
a more significant determinant of betweenness and K-core. General and firm-specific 
experiences have a correlation of 0.63 exactly the same as in Clement (1999). Both experiences 
have a positive correlation with size of the brokerage house and number of firms and industries 
covered by each analyst as in Clement (1999). The number of firms and number of industries 
covered exhibit also a positive correlation consistent with Clement (1999). These statistics 
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provides some assurance that the sample in this study is similar to other samples used in previous 
studies. 
Table III shows the conference call analysis that attempts to validate our network measures. 
Specifically, we test whether better connected analysts are more likely to participate in a 
conference call and if they ask more questions during that conference call. We collect conference 
call transcripts from Thomson Street Events for all companies that are followed by ten or more 
analysts. We use the conference call for the annual earning results of 2007 to code two variables, 
one if the analyst participates in the conference call and one for the number of questions the 
analyst asks during the conference call. We restrict our analysis to just one year since the data 
needs to be hand-collected from the individual transcripts and we need to keep the process 
manageable. The first three columns in Table III present the estimates from the logit model, and 
the last three columns from an ordinal logit model. We control for firm, brokerage house and 
firm specific experience effects since we expect these to be systematically related to both 
network measures and conference call activity. We find that the better connected an analyst is the 
more likely she is to participate in an earnings conference call and the more questions she is able 
to ask. This result supports findings in Mayew (2008) that analysts have differential access to 
management even after Regulations FD and also supports our underlying assumption that an 
individual’s connections increases the likelihood of receiving certain information sets.  
 
B. Forecast Measures 
Each analyst issues multiple forecasts for a firm during a year. Consistent with prior research 
(Clement 1999; Clement and Tse 2005) we exclude all forecasts with horizon less than 30 days 
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and we keep the last forecast issued within a year for each firm-analyst pair.4 We define forecast 
error of analyst i for firm j in year t (FEijt) as the absolute difference between the forecast and the 
actual earnings per share (EPS). 
 FEijt = Absolute (Forecast EPSijt – Actual EPSijt)  (1) 
To construct a simple measure of forecast timeliness we calculate the forecast horizon of the 
first forecast made by an analyst for each firm-year. Forecast horizon (FHijt) is the number of 
days between the forecast date and the earnings announcement date.  
 FHijt = First Forecast Dateijt – Earnings Announcement Dateijt  (2) 
We use a methodology similar to Clement (1999) by controlling for firm-year effects to test the 
hypotheses that analysts with higher social capital make more accurate and timely forecasts.5 
Therefore the demeaned versions of the above variables are: 
( )
( )
ijt jt
ijt
jt
FE Avg FE
DFE
Avg FE
 
−
 
=                                                        (3) 
( )
( )
ijt jt
ijt
jt
First FH Avg First FH
DFH
Avg First FH
 
−
 
=                                      (4) 
Since the social network measures are associated with known factors that affect accuracy and 
timeliness we need to be very careful that the research design appropriately controls for all other 
factors and thereby isolates the effect of social capital on forecast characteristics. We follow the 
methodology of Hong and Kubik (2003) and include control variables as fixed effects. 
Therefore, in all specifications we control for brokerage house, number of firms covered, number 
of industries covered, firms-specific experience and general experience effects. When the 
                                                          
4
 The results are not sensitive to this choice. Choosing the first forecast issued by each analyst for each firm-year 
pair yields similar results. 
5
 We deflate the variables with the mean of forecast error or horizon for each firm-year since Clement (1998) proves 
that this procedure reduces heteroscedasticity. 
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dependent variable is forecast error we also include forecast horizon effects. To allow for the 
possibility that the relation between the dependent and independent variables is time varying we 
also interact all the above effects with year effects (Y.E.).6 
1 # . . # . . . .
. . . . . .
itn
ijt
Betweenness firms xY E industries xY E General Experience xY E
DFE f
Firm - Specific Experince xY E Brokerage House xY E Horizon xY E
α β+ + + + + 
=  
+ + 
   (5) 
1 # . . # . . . .
. . . .
itn
ijt
Betweenness firms xY E industries xY E General Experience xY E
DFH f
Firm - Specific Experince xY E Brokerage House xY E
α γ+ + + + + 
=  
+ 
   (6) 
Although the specifications above include betweenness as the measure of social capital, we 
also re-estimate and run equations (5) and (6) by replacing betweeness with closeness or K-core. 
When we measure social capital using betweenness or closeness we expect β1<0 and γ1>0. When 
we use K-core we expect β1>0 and γ1<0. 
We follow Clement and Tse (2005) to calculate forecast boldness. We define boldness as the 
absolute distance of analyst i’s revised forecast for firm j from the pre-revision consensus 
forecast in year t (Distanceijt). We scale this variable to range from zero to one as in Clement and 
Tse (2005) to preserve the relative forecast boldness for firm j in year t. 
( )
( )
ijt ijt
ijt
ijt ijt
Distance Min Distance
Bold
Max Distance Min Distance
−
=
−
                                              (7) 
When dependent variable is forecast boldness, apart from the effects discussed above, we also 
include an indicator variable for the number of days between the previous forecast and the 
revision.  
 
                                                          
6
 We test the sensitivity of our research design by running separate cross-sectional regressions and then computing 
the coefficients and t-statistics as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). However, this procedure yields similar results and is 
not reported. 
Journal of Finance (Revise and Resubmit) 
 
16 
 
1 # . . # . . . .
. . . . . .
. .
it
n
ijt
Betweenness firms xY E industries xY E General Experience xY E
Bold f Firm - Specific Experince xY E Brokerage House xY E Horizon xY E
Days Elapsed xY E
+ + + + + 
 
= + + + 
 
 
α δ
    (8) 
Although equation (8) includes betweenness as a measure of social capital we also re-estimate 
and run equations (8) by replacing betweeness with closeness or K-core. When we use 
betweenness or closeness we expect δ1>0. When we use K-core we expect δ1<0. 
 
C. Analyst Turnover 
We measure unfavorable career outcomes by identifying analysts who stop providing forecast in 
I/B/E/S. We classify an analyst as losing her job if she appears in the dataset in year t but not in 
year t+1.7 We control for analyst experience, the number of firms and industries each analyst 
covers, and for the brokerage house the analyst is working for. We interact all indicator variables 
with year effects (Y.E.). Moreover, the model includes relative accuracy and optimism effects 
since Hong and Kubik (2003) find that more accurate and optimistic analysts face favorable job 
separations.8 We estimate the probability of turnover as: 
( )
1
1
it it it
n
it it itijt
it it
Betweenness # firms xY .E. # industries xY .E.
Pr Turnover f General Experience xY .E. Brokerage House xY .E.
RelativeAccuracy Effects RelativeOptimism Effects
α δ
+
+ + + + 
 
= + + 
 + 
         (9) 
We include indicator variables for various levels of the betweenness distribution similar to 
Hong and Kubik (2003), who also include indicator variables for accuracy and optimism to 
examine career outcomes. We expect that being in the right tail of the betweenness distribution 
                                                          
7
 This measure is a noisy indicator of career outcomes since analysts may stop providing forecasts because they 
voluntarily move to a buy-side firm. If these analysts are good performers with strong networks then we expect this 
to bias the results against finding the predicted negative relation between good network position and turnover. 
8
 To construct the relative accuracy and optimism indicators we scale each signed and unsigned forecast error as in 
equation (8) to preserve the relative rankings of error and optimism within each firm-year. Then we calculate the 
mean of accuracy and optimism from these scaled variables for each analyst-year. We include in equation (9) twenty 
indicator variables for optimism and twenty indicator variables for accuracy, for increments of five percent. 
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lowers the probability of turnover and being in the left tail of the distribution increases the 
probability of turnover. 
 
IV. Results on the Relation Between Network Position and Forecast Characteristics 
Table IV presents estimates of equation (5) where dependent variable is the forecast error. The 
coefficients on the social network variables are all significant at one or five percent level. Higher 
betweenness or higher closeness is associated with lower forecast error. Moreover, analysts 
whose connections are clustered in one group, thereby having high K-core, are less accurate.9  
An analyst at the 90th percentile of betweenness has 4.65 percent lower forecast error compared 
to an analyst at the 10th percentile. Similarly, an analyst at the 90th percentile of closeness has 
3.11 percent lower forecast error compared to an analyst at the 10th percentile. A similar move 
along the K-core distribution increases forecast error by ten percent. Clement (1999) reports that 
for a move from the 10th to the 90th percentile of firm specific experience, the number of firms 
covered or the number of industries covered the economic effects are 3.8, 1.5, and 2.9 percent 
respectively. Therefore, the network characteristics are of a similar significance as these 
variables in explaining forecast accuracy.  
These results also provide support to the idea that social network position gives an information 
advantage to analysts potentially through word-of-mouth effects. We also test whether network 
position has an association with forecast optimism since better-networked analysts might be 
more accurate because they are less optimistic. In unreported results we substitute in equation (5) 
the unsigned forecast error with the signed forecast error. We find that the coefficients on the 
network variables are all insignificant. The analyst’s network position therefore has no relation 
                                                          
9
 These results are robust to not including controls for all other variables. We find that forecast error decreases in 
betweenness, closeness and increases in K-core if we control only for firm x year effects. These relations are 
significant at one per cent level. 
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with their optimism after we include controls for other characteristics. We also include forecast 
optimism as an additional independent variable in equation (5) but the estimated coefficients for 
the network variables are unchanged to those reported in Table IV. 
Table V shows estimates of equation (6) where the dependent variable is the first forecast’s 
horizon for each analyst-firm-year. As expected, the coefficients on betweenness and closeness 
are positive, and are significant at one and five percent level respectively. Also the coefficient on 
K-core is negative and significant at one percent level. Analysts with higher social capital make 
their first forecast for each firm they cover earlier in the year. This suggests that these analysts 
exploit the early access to information, provided by their network position, to issue a forecast 
earlier. An analyst at the 90th percentile of betweenness (closeness) makes her first forecast four  
(three) days earlier, than an analyst at the 10th percentile. An analyst at the 90th percentile of K-
core makes her first forecast 11 days later than an analyst at the 10th percentile.  
We also construct a logit model to test whether better-networked analysts are the first to 
provide a forecast for a firm in a particular year. This model is different from the above analysis 
since it does not take into account the horizon of each forecast but separates forecasts between 
the first one made for each firm-year and all the rest. In unreported results we find that an 
increase in betweenness or closeness is associated with an increase in the probability of 
providing the first forecast. An analyst at the 90th percentile of betweenness (closeness) is more 
likely to make the first forecast by 0.5 (1.9) per cent, than an analyst at the 10th percentile. These 
effects are significant at ten and one per cent respectively. Since the unconditional probability 
that an analyst produces the first forecast is close to seven per cent, these marginal probabilities 
are economically interesting. An analyst at the 90th percentile of K-core is also less likely to 
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make the first forecast by 0.9 per cent compared to an analyst at the 10th percentile and this effect 
is significant at one per cent. 
Table VI presents estimates of coefficients when the dependent variable is forecast boldness 
(equation (8)). We find the more central analysts and those analysts who act as information 
brokers in the network make bolder forecasts. Both coefficients are positive and significant at 
one percent level. The coefficient on K-core is also positive although not significant. This result 
suggests that the information advantage the analyst’s receives from her ties, allows her 
communicate her private information rather than herd towards the forecast consensus. 
Collectively, the evidence suggests that an analyst’s structural position in the social network and 
thereby her level of social capital is positive and significantly associated with forecast 
characteristics. 
 
V. Results on the Association Between Network Position and Analyst Turnover  
Table VII presents results from estimations of the logit model in equation (9) for analyst 
turnover. We use betweenness for this analysis since it has been found that it is better able to 
capture the information advantage an individual gains from their network (Freeman, 1977). 
Although the results reported below are qualitatively unchanged when we use replace 
betweeness with closeness. We control for the brokerage house, experience, number of firms and 
the number of industries covered. We also include controls for accuracy and optimism because 
we want to focus purely on the incremental effect that the networks have on career outcomes. 
For example, given that networks have a positive association with accuracy, and accuracy has a 
negative association with turnover, we might find a negative relation between networks and 
turnover if we do no control for accuracy. 
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We find that an analyst who is in the bottom ten percent of betweenness increases the 
probability that she loses her job by 3.26 percentage points, which is statistically different from 
zero at the one percent significance level (see Table VII, column one). Moreover being in the top 
ten percent of betweenness decreases the probability that the analyst loses her job by 4.34 
percentage points, which is statistically different from zero at the one percent significance level 
(see Table VII, column two). In Table VII, column three we estimate more precisely the effect of 
social capital on analyst turnover by including dummy variables for various levels of 
betweenness except for the top ten percent. All the coefficients have a positive sign and the 
estimate is increasing monotonically as betweenness decreases. The marginal effect for being at 
the bottom ten percent of betweenness is an increase in the probability of turnover by 7.73 
percentage points relative to the top ten percent. In contrast, being in the bottom 75-90 percent or 
50-75 percent of betweenness increases the probability that an analyst loses her job by 6.26 or 
4.13 percentage points respectively.  These results provide support to the hypothesis that social 
networks influence career outcomes. 
 
VI. Determinants of Analyst Network Position 
A. Analyst Innate Ability and Network Position 
The results so far suggest that better-networked analysts have performed relatively better and 
that they are less likely to lose their job. However, our analysis as yet has not examined how 
analysts actually become networked in the first place. It might be the case that higher ability 
analysts perform better and as a result build a better network over time. If this is the case and 
control variables, such as brokerage house or experience effects, are not good proxies for this 
superior ability then the association between performance and network position may suffer from 
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an omitted variable bias. Although, we believe that these control variables adequately control for 
heterogeneity in ability (e.g. some level of human capital), we investigate formally whether 
analyst ability predicts strong network position.  
To investigate this relation we need to proxy for an analyst’s ability that is not influenced by 
her network position. We use each analyst’s average accuracy during her first year in the 
profession. We expect that network effects are non-existent in the first year of employment since 
the analyst has not yet developed solid connections. To construct this variable we use a 
transformation of forecast errors as in equation (7) to preserve the relative rankings within each 
firm-year and then we average this measure to construct an analyst-year measure. To adequately 
separate the measurement of the network variable from the first year of employment we require 
that the latter is at least three years before the year that we measure an analyst’s network 
position. We also control for the size of the brokerage house, number of firms and industries 
covered, average coverage by analysts10 and general experience. We measure these variables 
both at the year of the network measure and at the first year of employment.  
Table VIII presents estimates both including and excluding the contemporaneous control 
variables. The average distance between the years the network position is measured and forecast 
errors is measured is eight. Columns one and two present the estimates when the dependent 
variable is betweenness. The coefficient on first year’s forecast error is not significant nor is the 
sign robust. The higher ability analysts do not become better networked. In column one the 
results indicate that analysts, who work for larger brokerage houses, cover more firms and 
industries and cover firms that are followed by fewer analysts in the first year of employment, 
built up a better network position. In column two, the analyst’s experience also has positive and 
                                                          
10
 We expect that analysts who follow firms with higher analyst coverage will be more central in the network but 
will have fewer brokerage opportunities. 
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significant coefficient. Moreover, the variables measured in the first year of employment have 
incremental explanatory power even after we include contemporaneous variables. Both size of 
brokerage house and number of firms covered during the first year increase future social capital. 
Columns three and four present the estimates when the dependent variable is closeness and 
columns five and six when the dependent variable is the K-core. Across all specifications the 
coefficient on lag forecast error is not significant. Analysts, who work for larger brokerage 
houses, cover more firms and industries and cover firms that are followed by more analysts in 
the first year of employment, become more central to the network. Overall, the results suggest 
that analysts’ innate ability to forecast earnings is not related to their future network position. 
Therefore, the earlier association between performance and network position is unlikely to suffer 
from an omitted variable bias, such as human capital. 
 
B. Determinants of Network Position 
In this section we study factors that determine future network position. To do this we consider all 
analysts with at least five years of experience. To investigate how factors at different stages in an 
analyst’s career can influence network position we separate each analyst’s career to three parts. 
The first part spans from the first to the third year of her career, the second from the fourth year 
until one year before we measure the network position, and the third is contemporaneous with 
the measurement of the network. Forecast attributes in different stages of an analyst’s career 
might have different effects on her network position. For example, Hong, Kubik and Salomon 
(2000) find that younger analysts are more likely to face an adverse job separation if they are 
inaccurate or bold. 
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If more accurate analysts build stronger reputation and are rewarded from their brokerage 
houses then we expect that past accuracy will be associated with better connections. From an 
agency perspective, we expect past optimism by the analyst will predict a better network position 
since more optimistic analysts have more favorable career outcomes (Hong and Kubik 2003). As 
in Table VIII we include as independent variables the size of the brokerage house, number of 
firms and industries covered, average number of analysts covering a firm and general experience. 
All models in Table IX have high explanatory power. The adjusted R-squared in columns one, 
two, and three are 42, 80, and 67 per cent respectively. The most interesting results are with 
respect to forecast error and optimism. Accuracy in either the early or later years is not related to 
an analyst’s network position. In contrast, the more optimistic the analyst is in their later years 
the more likely they are to be better networked. Apparently, it would appear optimistic analysts 
are rewarded with the ability to build a stronger network which then enables them to make better 
forecasts. The coefficient on early optimism is insignificant. This may be because younger 
analysts might be reluctant to exhibit optimism since being optimistic early in an analyst’s career 
is not rewarded by building better network position. 
Both contemporaneous and lags of brokerage house size have a positive association with all 
measures. The number of firms covered is positively associated with closeness and betweenness 
and negatively associated with K-core, both contemporaneously and later in their career. 
Contemporaneous and earlier in career the number of industries covered has a beneficial effect 
on an analyst’s network position while later in career coverage of more industries has an adverse 
effect. The average number of analysts covering firms in an analyst’s portfolio later in her career  
also has a beneficial effect on their network position. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The paper is the first to connect a security analyst’s structural position in a social network to her 
performance and career prospects. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that analysts 
can gain an information advantage through their position in the network. Analysts with higher 
social capital make more accurate and bold forecasts. Also they issue on average earlier their 
first forecast for each firm in a year.  These results collectively suggest that the social network 
position of an analyst affects their performance. Furthermore, we find that analysts with higher 
social capital are less likely to face an adverse career outcome i.e. lose their job. This result 
suggests that analysts building stronger networks are more valuable to their brokerage houses. 
We also document that analysts build their network position primarily by exhibiting forecast 
optimism and not accuracy. 
The results support the conclusions of Stein (2008) who shows that word-of-mouth effects can 
take place even between competitors. However, these results are interesting not only from an 
academic perspective but also from a policy. The SEC has tried to eliminate information 
advantages received from selective disclosure. The results of this study suggest that such an 
advantage created by social network interactions still exists after the passage of Regulation FD. 
Given that social interactions surround economic life (Granovetter 1985) it is rather unlikely that 
any regulation will be able to fully eliminate such information advantages. 
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Appendix 
Construction of the Network 
Consider a network comprising of seven people. Each line represents a connection between the 
individuals (see the diagram below). In the context of this study we can consider for example 
actors 1 and 2 as directors of two different firms, firm A and firm B. These directors do not sit on 
any other boards and therefore there is no possibility that they are connected to each other. Actor 
3 is an analyst who works for brokerage house C and covers firms A and B. Therefore she is 
connected both to Director 1 and Director 2. Actor 4 is a director in firm D that Analyst 3 also 
covers and therefore Analyst 3 is also connected to Director 4. Director 4 does not sit on the 
same board with either Director 1 or Director 2 and therefore is not connected to either of them. 
Actor 5 is a director in Firm E and also sits on the same board of directors as Director 4 in Firm 
F. Therefore, Director 4 and Director 5 are also connected to each other through sitting on the 
same board Firm F. Actors 6 and 7 are analysts working for different brokerage houses and both 
cover firm E. Thereby they are both connected to Director 5 but not Director 4. They are also 
directly connected to each other since they cover the same firm, Firm E.  
 
Director 1          Analyst 6 
Firm A 
 
                
   
     (Analyst 3,  (Director 4,        (Director 5, 
    House C)  Firm D)  Firm E) 
            
           Analyst 7 
 
Director 1           
Firm B 
 
 
Measures of network Positions 
Closeness centrality is defined as the inverse of the mean geodesic distance (i.e. the shortest 
path) between a node v and all other nodes reachable from it. Closeness measures how close an 
actor is to all other actors or how central is the actor in the network, by taking into account the 
centrality of all other actors. Therefore, closeness is a measure of how long it will take for 
information to spread from a given node (i.e. an individual) to other reachable nodes.  
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X is the closeness centrality of a node v in a network where N is the number of nodes and u(v,w) 
is the distance between the given node (v) and another node (w). Director 4 has the highest 
closeness centrality 6/10=0.6 and therefore is better able to access the whole network quicker 
than anyone else. Director 1 and Director 2 have the lowest closeness measures 6/16=0.375. 
Analyst 6 and Analyst 7 have slightly higher closeness 6/15=0.4. Analyst 3 and Director 5 have 
even higher closeness 6/11=0.545.  
Betweenness is a centrality measure of a node within a graph. Nodes that occur on many shortest 
paths between nodes have higher betweeness than those that do not. For graph G: = (V,E) with n 
nodes, the betweeness XB(v) for node v is: 
wk
w v k VB
wk
( v )X ( v ) µ
µ
∑ ≠ ≠ ∈=  
Where wkµ is the number of shortest geodesic paths from w to k and wk( v )µ is the number of 
shortest geodesic paths from w to k that pass through a node v. This measure is normalized by 
dividing through the number of pairs of nodes not including v, which is (n-1) x (n-2). 
Betweenness takes into account that Analyst 6 and Analyst 7 communicate between themselves 
and therefore reduce the controllability of Director 5. Analyst 3 has the highest betweeness score 
16/45 = 0.356. Director 4 and Director 5 have slightly lower betweeness 13/45 = 0.289. Director 
1, Director 2, Analyst 6 and Analyst 7 have zero betweeness since they do not act as brokers in 
the network. 
K-core in graph theory was introduced by Seidman (1983) as a method of simplifying graph 
topology to aid in analysis and visualization. Given a graph G = {V,E} with nodes set V and 
edges set E, the K-core is computed by pruning all the nodes (with their respective edges) with 
degree less than k. That means that if a node v has degree dv, and it has n neighbors with degree 
less than k, then v’s degree becomes dv-n, and it will be also pruned if k>dv-n. K-core of a node 
is always less or equal that its degree. Therefore, K-core deflated by degree ranges always from 
zero to one. The higher this measure is for an analyst, the less scarce her information. Because 
graphical representation of K-cores is more complicated the reader is referred to de Nooy, Mrvar 
and Bategelj (2005) for further information. 
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Table I 
Number of Directors, Companies, Analysts and Brokerage Houses in the Network and the matched sample by year 
For each year, this table presents the number of directors and analysts included in the network or the sample. Also the number of companies with data on board 
of directors, the number of companies with data on analyst coverage and the number of brokerage houses is tabulated. 
  Network Sample Matched Sample 
Year # Directors 
# Companies with 
Directors 
# Analysts 
Network 
# Companies with 
Analysts 
# Brokerage 
Network 
# Companies 
Sample 
# Analysts 
Sample 
# Brokerage 
Sample 
2001 11,118 1,500 4,316 5,234 269 1,282 3,086 207 
2002 16,243 1,797 4,454 4,951 244 1,371 3,339 209 
2003 18,520 2,003 4,446 5,116 334 1,536 3,399 281 
2004 14,170 2,002 4,338 5,682 384 1,673 3,155 287 
2005 14,622 2,074 4,377 5,785 384 1,713 3,202 290 
2006 29,437 3,034 4,466 6,060 353 2,455 3,495 293 
2007 32,505 3,255 4,593 6,143 335 2,568 3,460 282 
Total 136,615 15,665 30,990 38,971 2,303 12,598 23,136 1,849 
Unique 42,376 4,444 10,508 10,231 612 3,502 7,736 485 
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Table II 
Correlation Matrix for Social Network Measures and Analyst Characteristics 
This table presents the correlations between the social network characteristics, analyst experience, size of the brokerage house and number of firms and industries 
covered by each analyst. Betweenness is the number of shortest distance paths between two actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest 
distance paths between these two actors. Closeness is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance between a vertex and all other vertices reachable from it. K-core 
is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where each analyst has at least k immediate neighbors. We divide this measure with the number of ties (degree) 
each analyst has. All three measures range from zero to one. Higher betweenness or closeness and lower K-core over degree characterize better-networked 
analysts. General experience is the number of years the analyst has been providing forecasts in IBES. Firm-specific experience is the analyst’s years of 
experience forecasting a particular firm’s earnings. # of analysts employed is the number of analysts in the analyst’s brokerage in each year. # of firms covered is 
the number of firms the analyst follows in each year. # of industries covered is the number of two-digit SIC industries the analyst follows in each year. Below the 
diagonal we present correlations for the raw variables and above the diagonal correlations for the variables after adjusting for firm-year effects. All correlations 
are significant at 1 percent. N=160,460. 
Variable General 
Experience 
Firm-specific 
Experience 
# of Analysts 
Employed 
# of Firms 
Covered 
# of Industries 
Covered 
Betweenness Closeness K-core 
General Experience  0.63 0.06 0.39 0.22 0.22 0.18 -0.30 
Firm-specific Experience 0.59  0.04 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.11 -0.18 
# of Analysts Employed 0.06 0.06  0.03 -0.07 0.21 0.75 0.23 
# of Firms Covered 0.27 0.17 -0.02  0.55 0.56 0.34 -0.76 
# of Industries Covered 0.16 0.11 -0.04 0.43  0.46 0.26 -0.51 
Betweenness 0.21 0.13 0.24 0.65 0.43  0.57 -0.35 
Closeness 0.16 0.13 0.64 0.28 0.24 0.50  -0.05 
K-core -0.23 -0.15 0.42 -0.66 -0.33 -0.35 -0.05  
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Table III 
Association between Network Measures and Conference Call Participation 
Logit and cumulative logit specification that examines whether an analyst’s position in the network is associated with the probability of conference call 
participation and the number of questions asked in the conference call. An analyst is coded as participating in the conference call if his name appears on the 
transcript. Number of questions asked is the number of questions each analyst asks and ranges from zero to four. Betweenness is the number of shortest distance 
paths between two actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest distance paths between these two actors.  Indicator variables for 
betweenness are included. Marginal probabilities appear below the coefficient estimates. For the cumulative logit the marginal probability is calculated for 
observations that the number of questions asked is four. The unconditional probability of participation is 38%. The unconditional probability that an analyst asks 
four questions is 5%. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level. **Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level (one-sided). 
    Participate in conference call Number of questions asked 
Parameter Predicted 
Sign 
Estimate 
(1) 
  Estimate 
(2) 
  Estimate 
(3) 
  Estimate 
(4) 
  Estimate 
(5) 
  Estimate 
(6) 
  
Betweenness + 476.300***  
    
454.800***  
    
  0.072      0.015      
Closeness +   27.310***      27.650***    
    
0.114  
    
0.020  
  
K-core -     -2.080**      -1.470**  
      
-0.056  
    
-0.009  
Firm effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Broker effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Experience effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N  
              
3,555   
                   
3,555   
              
3,555   
             
3,555   
            
3,555   
            
3,555   
Pseudo R-sq  29.01%  29.04%  28.92% 
 
 31.13%  31.18%  30.89%  
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Table IV 
Association between Network Measures and Forecast Error 
Ordinary least squares specification where the dependent variable is the forecast error for analyst i and firm j at time t. Betweenness is the number of shortest 
distance paths between two actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest distance paths between these two actors. Closeness is the inverse 
of the mean geodesic distance between a vertex and all other vertices reachable from it. K-core is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where each 
analyst has at least k immediate neighbors. We divide this measure with the number of ties (degree) each analyst has. All three measures range from zero to one. 
Higher betweenness or closeness and lower K-core over degree characterize better-networked analysts. The adjusted R-squared does not reflect firm x year 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage house level and tabulated below the coefficients in parentheses. **Significant at 5 percent level. 
***Significant at 1 percent level (one-sided). 
         Forecast error 
Parameter Predicted 
Sign 
Estimate 
(1) 
  Estimate 
(2) 
  Estimate 
(3) 
  
Betweenness - -25.33***  
    
  (6.48)  
    
Closeness -   -0.64**    
    
(0.31)  
  
K-core +     0.36***  
      
(0.04)  
Firm x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Broker x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Firms x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Industries x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
General Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Horizon x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N  160,460     160,460     160,460   
Adj R-sq  15.18%  15.03%  15.72%  
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Table V 
Association between Network Measures and Forecast Timeliness 
Ordinary least squares specification where the dependent variable is the horizon of the first forecast made within year t by analyst i, for firm j. The forecast 
horizon is the number of days between the forecast and the earnings announcement date. Betweenness is the number of shortest distance paths between two 
actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest distance paths between these two actors. Closeness is the inverse of the mean geodesic 
distance between a vertex and all other vertices reachable from it. K-core is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where each analyst has at least k 
immediate neighbors. We divide this measure with the number of ties (degree) each analyst has. All three measures range from zero to one. Higher betweenness 
or closeness and lower K-core over degree characterize better-networked analysts. The adjusted R-squared does not reflect firm x year effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the brokerage house level and tabulated below the coefficients in parentheses. **Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level 
(one-sided). 
Forecast horizon of first forecast 
Parameter Predicted 
Sign 
Estimate 
(1) 
  Estimate 
(2) 
  Estimate 
(3) 
  
Betweenness + 9.58***      
  (2.48)  
    
Closeness +   0.26**    
    
(0.12)  
  
K-core -     -0.17***  
      
(0.02)  
Firm x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Broker x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Firms x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Industries x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
General Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N    160,460       160,460       160,460   
Adj R-sq  6.17%  6.09%  6.21%  
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Table VI 
Association between Network Measures and Forecast Boldness 
Ordinary least squares specification where the dependent variable is the forecast boldness for analyst i and firm j at time t. The boldness is the absolute distance 
of analyst i’s revised forecast for firm j from the pre-revision consensus forecast in year t. The dependent variable is transformed as in equation (7) to preserve 
the relative rankings for each firm-year and to range between zero and one. Betweenness is the number of shortest distance paths between two actors that pass by 
a certain actor divided by the number of shortest distance paths between these two actors. Closeness is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance between a 
vertex and all other vertices reachable from it. K-core is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where each analyst has at least k immediate neighbors. 
We divide this measure with the number of ties (degree) each analyst has. All three measures range from zero to one. Higher betweenness or closeness and lower 
K-core over degree characterize better-networked analysts. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage house level and tabulated below the coefficients in 
parentheses. **Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level (one-sided). 
Forecast boldness 
Parameter Predicted 
Sign 
Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   
Betweenness + 0.0181***      
  (0.0065)  
    
Closeness +   0.0249***    
    
(0.0090)  
  
K-core -     0.0075  
      
(0.0071)  
Broker x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Firms x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Industries x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
General Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Horizon x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Revision Days x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N       72,189        72,189        72,189   
Adj R-sq  8.16%  8.16%  8.00%  
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Table VII 
The Effect of Network Position on Analyst Turnover 
A logit specification that examines whether an analyst’s position in the network is associated with the probability of turnover. The dependent variable is one for 
year t+1 if the analyst appears in the dataset in year t and not in year t+1. Otherwise it is zero. Betweenness is the number of shortest distance paths between two 
actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest distance paths between these two actors.  Indicator variables for betweenness are included. 
Twenty dummies are included for relative accuracy and optimism scores respectively. Marginal probabilities appear below the coefficient estimates. Standard 
errors are clustered at the brokerage house level. ***Significant at 1 percent level (one-sided). 
Analyst Turnover 
Parameter Predicted 
Sign 
Estimate   Estimate 
(1) 
  Estimate 
(2) 
  
Top 10% of Betweenness -   -0.2847***   
 
    -0.0434   
 
10-25% of Betweenness +     0.2273***  
      0.0386 
 
25-50% of Betweenness +     0.2314***  
      0.0393 
 
50-75% of Betweenness +     0.2426***  
      0.0413 
 
75-90% of Betweenness +     0.3606***  
      0.0626 
 
Bottom 10% of Betweenness + 0.1910***    0.4300***  
  0.0326 
   
0.0773  
Broker x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Firms x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of Industries x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
General Experience x Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Relative Accuracy Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Relative Optimism Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N       23,135           23,135         23,135   
Pseudo R-sq  14.46%  14.53%  14.64%  
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Table VIII 
Association between Network Measures and Analyst Ability 
An ordinary least squares specification examining whether the forecast errors at the first year of an analyst’s career are related to their future network position. 
An analyst is included only if her first year at the profession is at least three years before the measurement of the network variable. Betweenness is the number of 
shortest distance paths between two actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest distance paths between these two actors. Closeness is the 
inverse of the mean geodesic distance between a vertex and all other vertices reachable from it. K-core is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where 
each analyst has at least k immediate neighbors. We divide this measure with the number of ties (degree) each analyst has. All three measures range from zero to 
one. Higher betweenness or closeness and lower K-core over degree characterize better-networked analysts. Forecast error is measured as the average forecast 
error for each analyst-year of the as in equation (7) transformed forecast errors. General experience is the number of years the analyst has been providing 
forecasts in IBES. Brokerage house size is the number of analysts in the analyst’s brokerage in each year. # of firms covered is the number of firms the analyst 
follows in each year. # of industries covered is the number of two-digit SIC industries the analyst follows in each year. Coverage is the average number of 
analysts following a firm from the portfolio of firms of each analyst. Subscript t=1 means that the variable is measured at the first year of the analyst’s career. 
Subscript t means that the variable is measured at the same year as the network variable. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage house level. *Significant 
at 10 percent level.  **Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level (two-sided). 
                     Betweenness                          Closeness                         K-core 
Parameter Estimate 
(1) 
  Estimate 
(2) 
  Estimate 
(3) 
  Estimate 
(4)   
Estimate 
(5) 
  Estimate 
(6)   
Intercept 0.00016***  -0.00045***  0.32210***  0.27721***  0.41504***  0.91845***  
Forecast Errort=1 -0.00002  0.00001  0.00039  -0.00026  0.01295 
 
0.00307  
General Experiencet 
 
 0.00001***  
 
 0.00014***   
 
-0.00038  
Brokerage House Sizet 
 
 0.00015***  
 
 0.01364***   
 
0.02204***  
Brokerage House Sizet=1 0.00013***  0.00003***  0.01128***  0.00257***  0.00452*  -0.00251 
 
# of Firmst 
 
 0.00041***  
 
 0.00460***   
 
-0.16491***  
# of Firmst=1 0.00007***  0.00005***  -0.00084  -0.00026  -0.02868***  -0.01022***  
# of Industriest 
  
0.00019***  
  
0.00765***   
 
-0.04375***  
# of Industriest=1 0.00007***  -0.00002  0.00299***  0.00091  0.00241 
 
0.00984**  
Coveraget 
  
-0.00035***  
  
0.00407***   
 
-0.05242***  
Coveraget=1 -0.00005***  0.00001  0.00374***  0.00189***  -0.02167***  -0.01362***  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes         Yes  Yes  
N       12,955   12,955  12,955  12,955       12,955           12,955   
Adj R-sq 5.61%  38.60%  42.94%  78.41%  12.63%  64.72%  
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Table IX 
Determinants of Network Measures 
Ordinary least squares specification examining whether the forecast accuracy, optimism, brokerage and other analyst 
characteristics at various stages of an analyst’s career are related to their future network position. An analyst is 
included only if at the year the network is measured the analyst has five years of experience. Betweenness is the 
number of shortest distance paths between two actors that pass by a certain actor divided by the number of shortest 
distance paths between these two actors. Closeness is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance between a vertex 
and all other vertices reachable from it. K-core is an area of the overall network (a sub-network) where each analyst 
has at least k immediate neighbors. We divide this measure with the number of ties (degree) each analyst has. All 
three measures range from zero to one. Higher betweenness or closeness and lower K-core over degree characterize 
better-networked analysts. Forecast error is measured as the average unsigned forecast error for each analyst-year of 
the as in equation (7) transformed forecast errors. Forecast optimism is measured as the average signed forecast 
error for each analyst-year of the as in equation (7) transformed forecast errors.  General experience is the number of 
years the analyst has been providing forecasts in IBES. Brokerage house size is the number of analysts in the 
analyst’s brokerage in each year. # of firms covered is the number of firms the analyst follows in each year. # of 
industries covered is the number of two-digit SIC industries the analyst follows in each year. Coverage is the 
average number of analysts following a firm from the portfolio of firms of each analyst. Subscript early means that 
the variable is measured as the average during the first three years of the analyst’s career. Subscript late means that 
the variable is measured as the average from the fourth year of the analyst’s career until one year before the 
measurement of the network variable (t-1). Subscript t means that the variable is measured at the same year as the 
network variable. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage house level. **Significant at 5 percent level. 
***Significant at 1 percent level (two-sided). 
  Betweenness   Closeness   K-core 
Parameter     Estimate 
(1) 
  Estimate 
(2) 
  Estimate 
(3) 
  
Intercept -0.00102 *** 0.26541 *** 0.97296 *** 
Forecast ErrorEarly 0.00011  0.00148  0.00057  
Forecast ErrorLate 0.00026 *** 0.00298 
 
0.00676  
Forecast OptimismEarly 0.00007 
 
0.00193 
 
-0.01555  
Forecast OptimismLate 0.00012 ** 0.00456 *** -0.01622 ** 
General Experiencet 0.00001 *** 0.00013 ** -0.00024  
Brokerage House Sizet 0.00014 *** 0.01154 *** 0.01741 *** 
Brokerage House SizeEarly 0.00003 *** 0.00147 *** -0.00446 
 
Brokerage House SizeLate 0.00002 
 
0.00345 *** 0.01599 *** 
# of Firmst 0.00036 *** 0.00454 *** -0.14599 *** 
# of FirmsEarly 0.00001  -0.00129 ** 0.00602  
# of FirmsLate 0.00029 *** 0.00228 *** -0.05673 *** 
# of Industriest 0.00026 *** 0.00812 *** -0.05974 *** 
# of IndustriesEarly 0.00006 ** 0.00306 *** -0.01521 ** 
# of IndustriesLate -0.00022 *** -0.00270 *** 0.05388 *** 
Coveraget -0.00043 *** 0.00040  -0.01169 ** 
CoverageEarly -0.00003  0.00057  0.00796 
 
CoverageLate 0.00010 *** 0.00623 *** -0.07977 *** 
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
N       10,693         10,693         10,693   
Adj R-sq 41.86%  79.64%  66.62%  
 
